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The consequence of state controlled forestry in Cameroon has been the overexploitation of forest 
resources often in conflict with local forest dependent communities and state conservation objectives. The 
failure of state controlled forestry to achieve sustainable forest management has led to the emergence of 
new network like arrangements amongst which is independent forest monitoring (IFM) by civil society. 
The aim of this paper is to scrutinize the factors which affect the effectiveness of IFM governance 
network in Cameroon. Our research focused on a case study of Cameroon, employing a governance 
network perspective. The main findings are that national civil society in Cameroon is playing a significant 
role in improving transparency in the forest sector and holding decision makers to account. The paper 
finds a shift from technical areas of forest monitoring to the monitoring of social obligations and the 
respect of community rights by private companies. An analysis of actors highlights a strong network of 
national NGOs with self-defined goals and strategies engaged in very fluid relationships with law 
enforcement agencies beyond traditional ministries of forests and wildlife characterised by a spectrum 
ranging from complementarity, substitution and rivalry. The lack of sustainable funding and weak 
capabilities of national NGOs to navigate these fluid relationships emerges as core constraints for network 
effectiveness. Accordingly, recommendations for effectiveness entail strategies for sustainable funding, 
capacity strengthening and network coordination to address current weaknesses but also to build trust and 
credibility of the governance network. 
 









1. Introduction  
 
Forests provide a wide range of tangible and non-tangible goods and services from the local level to 
the planet (Byron and Arnold 1999, Garcia-Nieto et al. 2013). Tropical forests are host to the most 
important world’s territorial biodiversity, and play a significant role in mitigating global climate change 
and contributing to soil and water conservation (Mulata et al. 2017). In addition these forests provide 
many other vital resources and habitats for forest-dependent people such as provision of arable lands, 
non-timber forest products, woodfuel, medicine, religious and cultural sites (FAO 2014). In Africa, the 
Congo Basin forests form the second largest block of rainforest in the world after the Amazon and span 
six forest-rich countries: Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), the Republic of Congo (RoC), Equatorial Guinea (EG), and Gabon. Estimates of the 
number of people who derive direct or indirect benefits from the world’s forests in terms of employment, 
forest products, livelihoods and incomes stands at between 1 billion to 1.5 billion (Agrawal et al. 2013). 
Central African Forests provide direct subsistence services to over 60 million people who live within or 
near forests in addition to other social and cultural services particularly to indigenous forest peoples 
(FAO, 2014). In urban centres close to forests, they are a source of food to over 40 million people (Nasi et 
al., 2011).  
At least 80% of 5.4 billion hectares of global forests and wooded areas are state owned and a majority 
of these are under concessionary governance (Agrawal et al. 2008). Since the colonial era, this model of 
state-centred forest management has been the most common in South East Asia, parts of the Amazon and 
especially in West and Central Africa (Karsenty et al., 2008; Hardin and Bahuchet 2011). It has been 
argued that one of the consequences of state controlled forestry or ‘forest government’ (Arts, 2014) has 
been the overexploitation of forest resources often in conflict with local forest dependent communities 
and state conservation objectives (Bose et al., 2012). Forest government is characterized by concessionary 
systems with erratic or poor effective forest controls in place; corruption in the value and market chain; 
lack of resources for forest control given the vast areas of forests. The failure of forest government to 
achieve sustainable forest management has led to calls for multi-stakeholder forest governance processes 
beyond government (Cashore et al. 2012).  
The argument for multi-stakeholder deliberative processes is that public governance by itself is 
not sufficient to address collective action problems – there is need for governance systems that 
include non-state actors (Ostrom, 2003; Gutierrez and Morgan, 2017). These new arrangements 
include innovative non-state governance systems like public private partnerships, markets, private 
certification schemes, civil society forest monitoring amongst others (Arts, 2014; Trubek and 
Trubek , 2007; Young 2016).  
With the emergence of these innovative governance systems, there have been calls for a deeper 
understanding and conceptualisation of the formal and informal factors that affect  ‘real’ forest 
governance (Cashore, 2002; Agrawal et al., 2008; Humphreys 2012). While the role played by private 
sector in improving sustainable forest management through certification schemes has been widely 
researched (Cashore, 2002; Auld et al. 2008; Nasi et al. 2012), there is much less rigorous conceptual 
works of the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in addressing the core issues of forest governance 
in the tropics. This lack of knowledge is particularly relevant for some critical issues like illegal logging 
and related trade in the Congo Basin. This paper focuses on external independent forest monitoring (IFM) 
initiatives by civil society organisations as a new governance arrangement in the tropics, with one of the 
Congo Basin countries – Cameroon as case study. According to Brack and Leger (2013, p.11), IFM is 
suitable in a context such as Cameroon characterised poor governance, weak or ambiguous law 
enforcement mechanisms undermined by widespread illegality, corruption, cronyism, rent-seeking. In the 
case of tropical wood supply in Europe for example, the role of IFM was recognised in the European 
Union’s Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) action plan as a key component of 
timber legality and assurance systems (Brack and Leger, 2013). 
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Past research on the role of IFM in the Congo Basin has largely focused on the role of donor funded 
international environmental and activist NGOs such as Global Witness, Resource Extraction Monitoring 
(REM) and AGRECO (Fomete and Cerutti, 2008) while the role of national NGOs has been largely 
overlooked. In Cameroon, official mandated IFM projects ended in 2013 and since then Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) have struggled to monitor the sector, due to the limited number of actors and 
largely due to lack of human, material and financial resources. There remains a significant lack of 
appreciation and acceptance of IFM by local Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) amongst decision 
makers in the Congo Basin. In the same lens, there is limited uptake of IFM findings by forest authorities 
and the very role of civil society in monitoring is contested (Brack and Leger, 2013). As an example, 
empirical evidences from IFM are not readily taken into account by the private sector, law makers, anti-
corruption committees, and the justice system. Many donors and practitioners are concerned that national 
NGO IFM initiatives are producing disappointing results (Young 2016). To some authors, national civil 
society has not been particularly effective in assuming their role (U4 Brief, 2010). According to Young 
(2016), much remains to be done in mapping progress, identifying what works and what doesn’t work and 
why, and in providing better understanding of how the different networks operate in their environments to 
address forest illegality problems. This paper seeks to address some of these issues through participatory 
observation, documentary content and case study analysis of the standardised system for external 
Independent Forest Monitoring (SNOIE) in Cameroon. 
The following sections review the emergence of independent forest monitoring leading to the 
theoretical framework and hypotheses of the study. The methodology used is presented followed by the 
results and discussion sections. The paper ends with implications of the research. 
 
 
2. What is Independent forest monitoring by national NGOs? 
 
IFM entails a third party assessment of the conformity of forest management and forestry activities 
with the legislative and regulatory standards in force in the forestry sector of the country (Tegtmeyer et al. 
2010). The history of IFM dates back to the fundamental changes in the early 1990’s towards 
participatory forestry, with an emphasis on participatory forest resource assessment, and participatory 
inventory (see for example, Carter 1996). This, very broadly, encompassed a shift from seeing ‘forest 
management’, including planning, assessment, forestry practice and resource allocation as a purely 
professional role to be conducted by civil service or para-military forestry services, to one involving a 
range of stakeholders and interest groups, not least those directly affected by forestry or logging activities. 
As this approach matured it broadened out into activities that supported forest policy and provided an 
evidence-base for policy decision making. One of these innovative areas was independent forest 
monitoring.  
 According to Global Witness (2005), IFM arose ‘more or less spontaneously’, in response to local 
conditions in Asia and the Congo Basin (Cameroon). Global Witness designed IFM to complement and 
support official forest law enforcement with the objectivity and public credibility of an independent third 
party, improving transparency and contributing to the development of a sound legislative and regulatory 
framework for responsible forest management. Global witness, which was one of the pioneer 
organisations to promote independent forest monitoring in the tropics, defined IFM as the use of an 
independent third party that, by agreement with state authorities, provides an assessment of legal 
compliance, and observation of and guidance on official forest law enforcement systems (Global Witness, 
2005). IFM generally comprises of a field-based mission to gain evidence regarding a potential 
infringement of forest laws. This evidence is compiled in a report, which may be independently reviewed 
and verified, before being presented to a local governmental authority, usually those of the forest 
administration (Young 2007). The role of IFM has since evolved to include the implementation of these 
functions by self mandated national NGOs without the need for agreement with national governments. 
This is the case in Cameroon where contrary to other countries national NGOs opted to negotiate 
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agreements with national governments. However, Cameroon NGOs did not argue for independent 
monitoring to be recognised in international forest policy instruments, because they believed it could risk 
a loss of independence by the NGOs conducting the monitoring (NGOs in Ghana and Liberia took the 
same approach) (Brack and Leger, 2013). As an example, this was the case with EU negotiated voluntary 
partnership agreement with the government of Cameroon. According to ClientEarth (2017), the notion of 
‘independence’ in IFM relates to impartiality and non engagement of monitors in the subject of their 
investigations. This allows IFM organisations to interact not only with governments and private sector 
actors who are directly involved with forest management activities, but with any other national and 
international actors with the ability to influence forest governance processes.  
In the case of the Congo basin region, two main approaches of IFM co-exist; mandated and non-mandated 
IFM. Under mandated IFM, a national CSO negotiates a contract with the government to implement 
forest monitoring in support of the official government control function carried out by national forest 
control brigades. With regards to non-mandated IFM, civil society operates without an agreement or 
mandate from the government and therefore has greater autonomy in setting monitoring goals (Young, 
2016). This paper focused on non mandated IFM which is the only approach operational in Cameroon.  
 
 
3. Theoretical framework: governance network analysis 
This paper builds on a governance network analytical framework proposed by Klijn and Koppenjan 
(2012) with a background in policy studies, public administration and network management research. The 
governance network approach posits that network outcomes result from the actions of interdependent 
actors. In short, the notion of governance within the framework of this research refers to “self-organising, 
inter-organisational networks” (Rhodes, 1996). Three main types of governance networks are identified: 
policy networks, service delivery and policy implementation networks as well as governing networks 
(Klijn, 2008). The focus of this study is on governing networks, which seek to address societal problems, 
managing horizontal governance relationships and connecting governance networks with traditional 
institutions and deliberative processes. With roots in public administration research, the focus is how to 
manage networks and integrate them with traditional institutions. The key components of the governance 
network analytical framework are illustrated below (box 1).  
 
Box 1: Key components of the governance network analytical framework 
Actors, interdependencies and frames: according to Klijn and Koppenjan (2012), policy and service delivery is 
achieved through a network of interdependent actors. The effectiveness of these processes is shaped by how issues 
are framed, individual values, interests,  attitudes as well as the missions and mandates of the organisations they 
represent (Emerson et al, 2012). Interaction and complexity: According to Gutierrez and Morgan (2017), 
interactions range from relationships of complementarity, substitution, rivalry and even monopoly. As a 
consequence of the interdependencies and frames of different actors involved, their perceptions and strategies 
adopted in the definition and implementation of network activities, different interactions between actors create 
complexities. According to Klijn and Koppenjan (2014) complexities may lead to stagnation, blockages and 
success of network actions. 
Institutional features: These can be understood as patterns of social relations (interactions, power relations etc.) and 
patterns of rules” (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2012, pp 5). According to the institutional view, social interactions may 
result in rule definition and enforcement which regulates the way in which different actors interact thereby 
enforcing the legitimacy of collective action (Scott, 1995).  
Network management: These activities are aimed at facilitating interactions, exploring (new) content and 
organizing interactions between actors (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2012). Effective network management builds trust 
between network actors and those they seek to influence. Klijn and Koppenjan (2014) further indicate that 
successful network management increases interaction and cooperation, reduces complexity, improves the 
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achievement of government network outcomes. 
 
 
2.1  Effectiveness of governance networks and research hypotheses 
 
According to Klijn and Koppenjan (2012), effective policy and service delivery in governance 
networks is achieved through joint action of interdependent actors. In a study of UK and US fishery 
governance networks, Gutierrez and Morgan (2017) find that the need for collaboration and coordination 
creates interdependences between actors in goal setting, strategy development and implementation. 
Recent research by Emerson et al (2012) posit that the effectiveness of these processes is shaped by how 
issues are framed, individual values, interests,  attitudes as well as the missions and mandates of the 
organisations they represent. Additionally, it is the shared objective to be achieved that facilitates the 
building of trust and complementarities amongst interdependent actors it is argued (Kossmann et al., 
2016). However, Gutierrez and Morgan (2017) also found that the mismatch of structures, objectives and 
resources, lack of funding, resources and capability, lack of information about each other’s processes and 
absence of reciprocal awareness of each other’s actions were key constraints to network effectiveness. 
Lindahl et al (2017) in a comparative study of governance network models also found that effectiveness 
was influenced by institutional issues, power relations and path relationships.  
A key characteristic of governance networks is the interaction that exists between interdependent 
actors. According to Trubek, and Trubek (2007) the emergence of new governance forms in sectors 
regulated by conventional legal processes, allows for a wide range of configurations of interactions to 
become possible. As a consequence of the interdependencies and frames, perceptions and strategies 
adopted in the definition and implementation of network activities, different interactions between actors 
create conditions which may lead to stagnation, blockages and success of network actions (Klijn and 
Koppenjan, 2014).According to Gutierrez and Morgan (2017), these can range from relationships of 
complementarity, substitution, rivalry.  
Public governance and non-state market-driven governance systems complement each other because 
of formal or informal coordination. Complementarity occurs when governance mechanisms co-exist in 
the “same policy domain” and contribute to a “common objective” but have not merged into one 
governance system (Trubek and Trubek, 2007).” Complementarities emerge due to the need to share 
resources and a genuine partnership to tackle mutually agreed problems (Clark, 1993). According to 
Brinkerhoff (1999) complementary interaction generates synergistic effects that can lead to 
transformative effects in policy and service delivery.  
Adversarial relationships or rivalry on the other hand develops when public and non state governance 
systems compete for authority, or when it is perceived that the new governance regimes perform the same 
tasks as the legal regulation or even better (Gutierrez and Morgan, 2017). This can also arise when there 
is a perceived need for end users to choose between systems, where there are questions around the 
legitimacy and credibility of government led processes. The very first demonstration of this is found in 
the case of the relationship between Global Witness (GW) as independent forest monitor and Cambodian 
government in the late 1990s (Humphreys, 2009). GW received World Bank funding to monitor 
compliance of private sector and government with national legislation. In one of its landmark reports in 
1999, GW alleged that government officials were involved in illegal logging and this led to a backlash 
from government, which accused the NGO of fueling social unrest. Following years of adversarial 
relationships, this contract was terminated in 2004. Similar responses have been reported in Cameroon 
with the independent auditors of the Voluntary partnership agreements (VPA) between the government 
and the European Union on forest law enforcement, governance and trade (FLEGT) which led to the 
termination of the contract in 2013. In order to build trust, strengthen coordination and address rivalrous 
situations, Klijn and Koppenja (2012) recommend networking and effective network management by 
those in charge of steering network activities.  
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Substitution effects occur when public and non state actor governance networks co-exist and generate 
products and or services that actors consider similar enough that they can be substituted (Guitierrez and 
Morgan, 2017). According to the authors, this can lead to waste, increased costs and duplication of efforts 
between different governance systems. The benefits of substitution effects emerge for instance where 
products or services from one system are discontinued for one reason or another. In this paper, we argue 
that substitution provides resilience and sustainability of access to the products/services by potential users 
and therefore, has a positive effect on achieving network goals.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Complementary and substitution interactions between independent forest monitoring 
network actors are positively related to achievement of improved forest governance outcomes 
 
Hypothesis 2: Adversarial/rivalrous interactions between independent forest monitoring network actors 





3.1 Data collection  
 
This research adopted a mixed qualitative methods approach consisting of participatory observation, 
documentary content and case study analysis (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012). According to White and Marsh 
(2006) content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from text (or 
other matter) to the context of their use. The authors explored documentary evidence, grey literature and 
case studies addressing multi-stakeholder processes in the Congo Basin in line with IFM. This involved 
online information searches on project websites, conference reports, annual organisational reports and 
keynote statements and presentations of experts in key conferences and seminars. IFM related project 
reports managed by the lead author in the Congo Basin were reviewed. The first project (DCI-ENV 
/2013/323-906) was a two-year EU development project implemented in Cameroon and Central African 
Republic (CAR) between 2014 and 2016. The project focused on the promotion of forest peoples’ rights 
in national forest governance processes. All reports exploited care accessible via the project website. The 
second project (ENV/2016/380-500) is a four-year EU project (2017 to 2020) with specific objective of 
strengthening civil society led IFM and advocacy. Following White and Marsh (2006), we moved from 
the constructs of the governance network analytical framework and the researcher’s expertise in the area 
to scan the texts (reports, articles) collected. This allowed us to identify broad subject headings in line 
with the framework.  A closer analysis was then carried out on each report to identify and make 
inferences on the different issues addressed in line with the effectiveness of the IFM network in 
Cameroon.  
3.2 SNOIE case study 
In 2015 a group of NGOs in Cameroon came together and began to put in place a system for civil 
society led IFM within the context of the FLEGT VPA process. This network allows national NGOs to 
collaborate with international advocacy agencies and the state forest bureaucracies mainly the Ministry of 
Wildlife and Forests (MINFOF) in Cameroon. The aim of this initiative was to address forest governance 
failures. The national NGO Forêts et Développement Rural (FODER) has played a steering role and 
coordinated the interactions within the IFM network. This network is made up of 12 other NGOs as well 
as the subsidy of an international partner named Transparency International Cameroon leading advocacy 
actions. Part of the network includes an innovative multistakeholder governance structure functioning as a 
‘reading committee’ which examines and validates IFM reports before publication. A member NGO is 
designated by the general assembly to manage the network and links between the IFM coordination unit 
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and national government agencies especially the national forest control brigade of MINFOF, ministries of 
agriculture, social affairs and justice.  
SNOIE’s development was driven by a bottom-up observation that ‘classical IFM’ hadn’t delivered 
the required change and improvements in forest law enforcement and governance: responsiveness to IFM 
reports was very low by both the government and private sector, and the approach to civil society led 
monitoring has been very weak, using diverse methodologies and tools, and missing coordination of 
actions and approaches related to Independent Monitoring.  Stakeholders, primarily NGOs involved in 
independent monitoring, wanted a standardised methodological approach to address these issues. The 
IFM network established a standardised system of independent observation (SNOIE) as a set of operating 
methods for monitoring of natural resources based on an international standard (ISO 9001: 2015) which 
includes observation, verification, communication, and lobbying. The SNOIE seeks a clear division of the 
roles of the monitoring or partner organisations involved in the system.  
4 Results 
 
4.1 Actors, roles, interests and characteristics of the IFM network in Cameroon 
 
In developing the SNOIE system in Cameroon, FODER carried out a wide stakeholder analysis 
which allowed them to engage different stakeholder groups in goal and strategy setting including 
government agencies (Figure 1).  
 
Figure legend: MINFOF = Ministry of Forests and Wildlife; MINEPDED: Ministry of Environment, 
Nature Protection and Sustainable Development; MINTSS: Ministry of Labour and Social Security; 
MINAS: Ministry of Social Affairs; MINADER: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development; 
CONAC: national Anti-Corruption Commission; DD = Divisional Delegation; DDR= Regional 
Delegation; CPFC = Chief of Forest and Wildlife Control Post; PTF: = Technical and Financial Partners 
 
Figure 1: An application of SNOIE network model in independent forest monitoring system in Cameroon 
 
Figure 1 identifies the different actors involved in the IFM governance network in Cameroon. This 
includes internal actors comprised of 12 national NGOs that make up the network and the network 
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management group represented by the IFM Coordination. To ensure that there is effective response and 
impact from IFM reports, the network actively engages with external actors such as national and 
decentralised state bureaucracies, local and indigenous forest communities, media, VPA implementation 
units, national and international interest groups. This is also because of the shift from “classic IFM” that 
has tended to focus on the technical aspects of forestry to include social concerns related to the respect of 
social obligations, safeguards, as well as community and workers’ rights, which are of interest to wider 
stakeholder groups. Though SNOIE operates without a formal mandate from government, national NGOs 
fully acknowledge the sovereign forest control and enforcement role of the state and create opportunities 
for complementarity and collaborative action while ensuring objectivity and impartiality in the 
implementation of field investigations and reporting. Table 1 identifies the actors, roles and interest of 
non state actors in the IFM network while table 2 focuses on the formal roles and interests of state 
bureaucracies in IFM. 
 




Self defined role Formal interests and actions 
National NGOs Watchdog, citizen control 
Advocacy for community rights 
Representation of forest 
dependent communities 
Technical assistance to 
communities 
 
Monitoring forest law enforcement and 
compliance of actors with national legislation, 




Advocacy for ‘good 
governance’  
promotion of law enforcement, assessment of 





Claiming a better benefit sharing system from 
forests 
, improving livelihoods and forest 
Preservation  
Media  Communication of IFM findings 
and studies 






Facilitate network meetings 
Coordination with external 
actors 
 
Rule setting, internal audits and commissioning 
of external audits 
Effectiveness and efficiency of IFM function 




Technical and financial 
assistance 
Improving forest governance by strengthening  
accountability and multi-stakeholders 
participation, production and dissemination of 
reliable information, providing funding and 











Category of actor Formal role Formal interests in IFM goals  
MINFOF Sovereign role – legal /forest owner 
Forest control and enforcement 
Coordination and facilitation of 
national level governance processes 
Traceability systems 
Attribution of rights 
Tax distribution and investments 
Increasing credibility of forest control 
function 
Increasing transparency in the forest 
sector 
Increasing incomes and improving 
benefit sharing from forests 
Reducing forest illegality and related 
trade 
MINADER Formal administration in charge of 
agricultural development including 
granting of forest areas for agri-
business 
Monitoring of allocated permits for 
agricultural development 
MINJUSTICE Application of national legal and 
penal code 
fostering justice in forest sector 
MINAS Enforcement of social obligations of 
companies and community rights 
Fostering social equity in forest sector 
MINEPDED Environmental protection and 
conservation 
Promoting social and ecological 
sustainability in forest sector  
MINTSS Workers’ rights and working 
conditions in forest companies 
Access to credible information and 
promoting of labour law enforcement in 
forest sector 
Local councils and 
territorial 
administrations 
Decentralised forest control 
Management of special forest 
development funds 
Local oversight of forest rights 
holders 
Overall coordination of forest operations 
and promotion of  related 
local development 
Independent 
auditor of the VPA 
Audit of the VPA system Source of information and third party 
verification 
Encouraging production of reliable, 
credible and relevant information 
CONAC Fight against corruption Assessing corruption and facilitating 










In line with the governance network analytical framework, table 3 provides a summary of key 
characteristics of the IFM network concerning goal setting, strategies and network management activities 
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as well as examples of how these play out in practice. The table portrays the IFM model as a 
multistakeholder driven and experimentalist network. For instance through adoption of ISO 9001 
standards for field monitoring, the establishment of a reading committee and strong experimentation with 
modern technologies, social media and satellite imagery to strengthen credibility and reliability of 
independent forest monitoring reports and publications. 
 
Table 1: Characterisation of strategies, rule setting and management features within IFM network 
Item  Feature   Examples  
Strategy  - Community alert system  
- Use of satellite and mobile technologies  
- Independent and joint field monitoring 
missions with state administrations 
- Multi-actor reading committee 
- Publication of reports 
- Advocacy  
- External independent audits 
- Capacity building 
- Media engagement 
- Communities use mobile phones to 
send alerts to IFM NGOs (forest link) 
- Reading committees comprise of 
NGOs, national forest control brigade, 
judiciary and NGOS 
- External audit of the quality 




- leadership of the IFM coordination by a 
national NGO 
- Monthly coordination meetings 
- Mobile phone applications used to 
facilitate communication 
- Coordination meetings with national 
forest administration 
- The IFM coordination holds quarterly 
meetings to review and plan activities 
but also share information and 
coordination 
- A WhatsApp group enhances real 




- General assembly meetings of members 
agree on roles and responsibilities, action 
plans and budgets 
- Labeling and certification of specific or 
overall process is issued 
- Internal quality management reviews 
 
- An annual general assembly of the 
IFM coordination is organised  
- ISO 9001 provide the guidelines for 
quality assurance and evaluation of 
performance 
- Bi-monthly quality reviews ensure 
standards are applied and staff 
capacities are regularly updated 
- Use of FLEGT WATCH radar based 





In addition to the features identified in table 2, funding and organisational capacities were also identified 
as key factors affecting IFM effectiveness. With regards to funding, results show that the IFM network is 
completely dependent on external funding from initiation. This situation represents a key weakness of the 
network activities suggesting that financial sustainability is in danger. Even where NGOs succeed to raise 
funding for IFM, this tends to be short term and intermittent suggesting that these actions are very likely 
to be interrupted once funding runs out.  
As with the funding of IFM field missions, a lot of donor funding has gone into building 
organisational and operational capacities of IFM NGOs in order to improve their performance and long-
term sustainability contributions. Results of capacity needs assessments of IFM organisations in 
Cameroon. This was the case by the Centre for International Development and Training (CIDT) in 2014 
which highlighted weak organisational capacities in areas of gender mainstreaming, leadership and 
strategic skills, financial management and external relations. Weak organisational and institutional 




Figure 2: Organisational capacity needs assessment of IFM organisations in Cameroon 
Source: CIDT (2014) 
 
 
A key characteristic of governance networks is interaction between interdependent actors. As 
highlighted before, these interactions and strategies adopted by different actors create complexities which 








Complementarity is demonstrated in this case study as IFM is seen to complement the official 
government forest control function all seeking to improve transparency, accountability and forest law 
enforcement. A key component of the VPA is the establishment of timber traceability and legality 
assurance systems. The role of independent monitors is widely acknowledged as having an important 
watch dog role to ensure that private sector as well as government actions operate in respect of the law 
through out the timber value chain. The participation of civil society in these processes is seen to 
strengthen the credibility of government led systems and therefore by opening up space for IFM, national 
state bureaucracies demonstrate their openness to stakeholder engagement and citizen participation. Even 
though the SNOIE network does not have a formal mandate with the governmental authorities, NGO 
actors have put in place systems to engage with forest administration (MINFOF). For instance, FODER 
will not publish reports without first of all submitting them for examination by a multistakeholder reading 
committee and MINFOF. As a result of the separation of roles and quality of IFM outputs, MINFOF 
through its national forest control brigade is increasingly taking part in joint field missions initiated by 
FODER and vice versa. The Ministry regularly invites IFM organisations to join field missions in order to 
verify claims made in NGO reports. This is interesting because it demonstrates a convergence in 
approaches between mandated and non mandated IFM towards government. It is a recognition that at the 
end of the day only the government has the power to sanction, enforce or bring defaulters to justice. For 
this to happen, NGOs must demonstrate credibility, professionalism, quality in their activities and respect 
for the national legislation in force. The response by private sector and forest dependent communities to 
the complementary actions of NGOs and government agencies is mixed. On the one hand, communities 
value their role as guardians of the forest through improved response and verification of transmitted alerts 
through geo-referenced reports of forest illegalities using mobile phones and smart technologies 
(Rainforest UK, 2019). On the other hand, private companies engaged in illicit activities are less receptive 
because of the increased presence of independent third parties in their areas of intervention. The evidence 
shows that SNOIE reports have led to increased government controls, fines and sanctions against 
companies for illegal behaviour (FODER, 2017). For instance, the forestry company Oye et Compagnie 
was fined the sum of 7.5 million FCFA (12,000 euros) by the Ministry of Forests and Wildlife (MINFOF) 
following a denunciation report produced by the organisation PAPEL (Support Programme for Livestock 
Production and Conservation of Biodiversity in Protected Areas) which is part of the SNOIE network in 
2018 (Kouetchua, 2018). 
The advocacy function implemented by Transparency international Cameroon Chapter in this case 
further highlights the importance of complementarity as well as the role of power relationships in 
achieving network goals. NGOs led governance networks find justification to engage with government 
agencies including traditional law enforcement agencies and law makers in order to develop mutually 
beneficial relationships. However, being very close to state bureaucracies and related authorities also 
comes with a lot of risks especially in authoritarian and corrupt regimes characteristic of the Congo Basin 
region (Ongolo and Karsenty, 2015) as NGOs become exposed to the loss of their autonomy, security and 
corruption attempts. These can very easily lead to adversarial relationships and rivalry in the interactions 





As mentioned before, many in the target countries continue to see international forest monitoring 
organisations as donor led and driven by international activist NGOs to criticise private sector and 
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government actions especially in postcolonial countries. In Cameroon for instance, SNOIE reports of 
officials involved in illegal forest practices led governmental authorities to dismiss and sanction and 
transfer divisional delegates in some regions in 2018. Private sector companies are completely opposed to 
NGO led IFM interestingly they argue because they don’t have any mandate from national government 
despite the role of IFM clearly articulated in national forest legislation or provisions of the VPA. State 
bureaucracies criticise them for violation of national sovereignty, their alleged negativity and conspiracy 
with international activist organisations to tarnish government’s image and the national timber market. 
For instance, Greenpeace published a scathing report in 2015 about illegal behaviour of a Cameroonian 
company “Compagnie De Commerce et de Transport (CCT)” (Greenpeace Netherlands, 2015). This 
report was met by a brutal response from a former Minister of Forestry in Cameroon -Philip Ngwese 
Ngole- who disparaged the report as being built on false truths. On 8 March 2016 the Dutch Food and 
Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA) reported it had filed a report with the public prosecutor 
against a Dutch company alleged to have done business with the Cameroon Company in bridge of the 
EUTR. The Dutch company was issued a conditional penalty to be paid if they continued to do business 
without an effective due diligence system. Many decision-makers in Cameroonian state bureaucracies 
accused national IFM organisations to have been at the origin of the information contained in the 
Greenpeace report. This situation creates an environment of mistrust amongst public and non government 
actor networks. Ongolo and Karsenty (2015) refer to the “blame avoidance” theory to argue that state 
bureaucracies in areas of limited statehood or fragile states use these tactics to avoid responsibility in 
forest governance failures as they strive to manipulate the public opinion away from the issues and to 
protect private rents and benefits to powerful elites, dominant policy-makers and their private allies.  
Another area of rivalry is in access to financial, human and material resources especially from 
international donors. Many governments in the tropical regions justify weak forest law enforcement to the 
lack of adequate financial, material and human resources. In an era characterised by national debt and 
increasingly stringent conditions for accessing donor funding, government departments struggle to raise 
resources for their formal and informal agenda (Karsenty and Ongolo, 2012; Ongolo and Karsenty 2015). 
On the other hand, recipient state bureaucracies accuse donors of funding NGO projects and for fuelling 
the activities of non elected NGO representatives. In these cases competition, disputes and mistrust 
develops between networks because many public administration officials protest about the fact that NGO 
staff are better paid and have better working conditions. Consequently, this means that when joint 
missions are organised, government staff may intentionally refuse to document infractions or to 
record/propose sufficient fines for observed illegalities. In other instances, State bureaucracies’ officials 
ask for payments from NGOs when they are requested by their departments to accompany NGO staff to 
the field. Rivalries are also identified within government departments -the case of regular disputes 
between the ministry of forestry and the ministry of environment in Cameroon- as well as amongst 
different IFM organisations.  
With regards to rivalries within government departments, the case also highlights the lack of 
convergent interest and collaboration between some specific key state bureaucracies of forest sector such 
as the ministry of forestry, the ministry of environment, the ministry of economy, police forces and 
judiciary.  In Cameroon as in many countries in the Congo Basin, the most influent ministries in forest 
policy domain prefer to engage in transactions with private sector companies that have been identified in 
IFM reports. Through the process of transaction, fines and sanctions can be watered down and informal 
payments made for the benefit of government officials as opposed to the public treasury. Recent evidence 
from Cameroon suggests that state officials collect over 6 million euros per year in informal taxes and 
hence there is no intention to promote transparency, equity or accountability (Cerutti et al. 2013; Ongolo 
and Karsenty, 2015). The strangle hold of the ministries of forests in this direction means that there is no 
interest to include traditional law enforcement agencies. This situation perpetuates a vicious cycle of 
corruption and creates unintended effects from the view point of IM organisations. In fact IM reports 
become a source of relevant information for government officials who use the information to enter into 
transactional arrangements with companies or individuals alleged to be involved in illegality. From 
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private sector perspective particularly those involved in illegal activities this maybe facilitating the 
legalisation of illegal timber. These behaviours only add to the problem of unfair competition between 
illegal companies and those which seek to respect the law. Further research should explore the extent to 
which more law abiding or “citizen companies” may be willing to report and denounce the behaviour of 
their illegal competitors. Such evidence could facilitate collaboration between NGOs, national 
government and private sector in real public private partnerships in the fight against illegal logging. 
Within NGO actor groups, rivalry is observed in the Cameroon where only a limited number of 
NGOs regularly obtain donor funding. Within the SNOIE network with 12 NGOs in Cameroon, less than 
three have access to long term funding for IFM. Under these circumstances, the more successful NGOs 
grow in status and the unsuccessful ones develop dependency relationships becoming agents or get 
demotivated and opt of networks. Furthermore, even when NGOs identify other complementary resources 
which they bring to the networks (such as leadership, technical expertise and closeness to forests and 
forest dependent communities), questions about funding remain a significant threat to network 
performance. It is important to note that rivalries do not always result in negative outcomes for networks 





Substitution manifests itself when non state and state governance systems co-exist and produce 
outputs and services that actors consider similar enough that they can be substituted (Guttierez and 
Morgan, 2017). We identify substitution in the area of information portals for publication of forestry 
information. In Cameroon for instance the government has as part of its commitments under the VPA, 
created an information portal for the forest sector. This is intended to be a one stop shop where 
stakeholders can readily access up to date information about the forest sector including information about 
forest illegalities and actions undertaken by the governmental authorities to enforce the law. Parallel to 
government information portals, IM organisations publish their reports on the internet and on social 
media. A good example is the open timber portal developed by World resources Institute and national 
IFM actors in Cameroon which is a georeferenced repository of IFM reports. National and international 
actors seeking information about the forest sector in the Congo Basin have the opportunity to access both 
government and NGO information portals. The case of information portals is interesting because 
government websites are often criticised for not being operational most of the time, that information is not 
updated on a regular basis or that many mandatory documents are not uploaded nor can be downloaded 
by users. Some users regularly question the accuracy of reports published by the ministry of forestry in 
terms of the issue of trust in the source. NGO operated websites may be more functional and up to date 
but with limited access to official government documents, end users have to decide which sources of 
information to use or to trust.  
There is no current source for forest control reports controls carried out by forest administrations or 
police forces in the Congo Basin. For this reason, the only sources of information can be obtained from 
individual forest company websites particularly those that are labelled by forest certification standards 
where summaries of auditor’s reports can be accessed. Civil society reports and information platforms 
provide alternative sources of information for different actors. The SNOIE network by using ISO 9001 
quality management standards seeks to play a significant role through improving the credibility and 
reliability of its outputs (Interphase, 2018). There is already evidence that even the state bureaucracies 
increasingly use this information and considers this system favourably given the increased level of 









For the past decades, international development actors have been trying to improve the way forest 
policies are designed, implemented and evaluated in Africa through the ‘good governance’ agenda in 
view of serious failures (Ongolo and Karsenty, 2015). One of the policy instruments promoted by the 
European Union in this direction has been the introduction of the FLEGT VPAs as a tool to engage 
timber producing countries in the fight against illegal logging and related trade in tropical regions. This 
initiative strongly promotes the engagement of other actors beyond government in the various policy 
processes to ensure responsiveness, legitimacy and effectiveness. It is argued that increased deliberation, 
cooperation, and learning at local level will enhance integration of the concerns of local circumstances, 
build on local knowledge and capacities, and result in greater stakeholder ownership and “buy-in” 
(Gunningham, 2009).  
The objective of this paper was to explore the role of IFM networks in improving forest governance 
in Cameroon by using an innovative governance network approach. By so doing it responded to calls for 
research to improve understanding of new governance models in the forest sector (Agrawal et al., 2008). 
The paper used a case study approach to analyse the function of an IFM network, to evaluate the factors 
which facilitate or constrain its effectiveness. Building on the complementarity, substitution and 
transformation frameworks proposed by Trubek and Trubek (2007) and further expanded by Guitierrez 
and Morgan (2017), the paper explored the outcomes of different forms of interaction between actors and 
outcomes.   
 
5.1 Initiation and operation of IFM networks 
 
This research shows that a number of factors contributed to effective initiation and creation of the 
IFM network in Cameroon to address forest governance challenges. The paper found that FODER, a 
national NGO, adopted a participatory and inclusive approach, maintained open dialogue in goal setting, 
strategy development, definition of roles and rules of engagement with different actors. This is 
demonstrated in the process of experimentation of quality management systems to address IFM 
challenges and weaknesses. For instance FODER carried out a stakeholder analysis at the beginning 
which allowed them to identity relevant actors, their interests and map out their power and influence 
positions. According to Brinkerhoff (1999), these approaches allows for a degree of convergence as 
starting point given the broad range of interests, power differential as a result of differences in resource 
levels, operational capacity and political clout.  
 
5.2 Interdependencies of actors 
 
In Cameroon the SNOIE network does not have a formal mandate with national government but do 
have a strong engagement strategy with some state bureaucracies such as forest administration, 
parliamentarians and media. This supports the recommendations from Fox (2016) that developing closer 
links with key powerful actors can lead to positive network outcomes. Our research further shows a level 
of convergence between NGO actions and the importance of engaging with those with an elected mandate 
to enforce the law. The example here further demonstrates the role of political will and coordination 
between government departments in support of Somorin et al (2013) who reiterate the role of capacities 
and competencies, formal and informal institutions as factors which can facilitate or constrain interaction 
and coordination.  
 
5.3 Capacities for action 
        Managing interdependencies between key actors is essential for effectiveness of policy management 
and state-civil society collaboration (Brinkerhoff, 1999) yet we found that managing external relations 
linked to negotiation skills, skills to bind actors and skills to forge new solutions that appeal to various 
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actors whose resources were are required to implement solutions were weak (see figure 2). In support of 
Humphreys (2009), we found that relationships between state bureaucracies and NGOs are fluid and 
sometimes tense. Coupled with the organisational weaknesses identified, NGO actors need to develop the 
skill set to foresee and deal with adversarial issues. 
 
5.4 Complexities in interactions and the role of state bureaucracy 
 
This paper paints a very complex image of interactions in this process between interdependent actors 
– government actors, private sector, communities, NGOs in the fight against illegality and related trade in 
Cameroon. This research finds that relationships between actors are not linear and sometimes are even 
erratic/opportunistic (Kossmann et al. 2016). The evidence suggests that governance network actions 
sometimes result in win win situations and positive outcomes where there are complementarities but often 
take time, transaction costs, power relationships drive issues and sometimes results in communications of 
the deaf, disappointments where rivalries exist. Our findings were largely in line with extant research in 
the area of governance networks. For instance, we found that the legitimacy and authority of surveillance 
by unelected and unaccountable individuals (Green et al. 2007) within the IFM network was often a 
source of tension as a result of unfavourable reports (Humphreys, 2009). We identified inertia from state 
bureaucracies to act on reports (Richards et al.2003) which demonstrated weak state bureaucracy 
commitment to forest law enforcement especially in Cameroon (Ongolo and Karsenty, 2015). 
Through this paper, we also identify the role of monopolies and substitution effects in the forest 
monitoring and law enforcement landscape on the basis of the stated roles and manifestations of civil 
society and government actions. Monopolies emerge when actors possess sole authority and therefore 
have a monopoly over certain governance tools (Gutierrez and Morgan, 2017). As already revealed in the 
analysis, the IFM model recognises the sovereign role of the state in forest law enforcement and the tools 
at its disposal. Starting with forest governance reform and international conventions, government entities 
have sole responsibility to negotiate and sign agreements with international organisations with regards to 
SFM. This includes the voluntary partnership agreements as well as the emerging REDD+ arena. With 
regards to forest control, only sworn officials can issue fines, sanction and arrest individuals alleged to be 
involved in illegal activities. While government entities may have monopoly to issue sanctions, civil 
society organisations also have some options at their disposal. This involves naming and shaming which 
can affect the image and credibility of those involved. The framing of issues in this case is usually a 
source of rivalry between different governance systems which can cause stagnation and blockages in the 
realisation of network goals. The emergence of substitution effects between government and NGO 
information portals further strengthens the argument for increased participation of non state actors in 
tackling illegal logging and improving transparency in the forest sector. Through the operation of non 
state and state information portals, information needs of different stakeholder groups are satisfied in a 
timely matter in the absence of up to date or credible government reports or forestry information. In a way 
these portals could be seen as redundant/duplicative and costly if they provide the same functionalities 
and service but also provide resilience in the sense that one system provides services when the other is 
down. This resiliency can also be tested if funding for one system were to be curtailed, so having 
alternatives means that users and citizens can continue to have oversight of the sector. 
 
5.5. Trust building, synergies and complementarity 
 
Building trust between network actors emerged as a very significant factor in achieving positive network 
outcomes. The case of SNOIE shows that trust develops when network goals, strategies and actions are 
built on bi-directional understanding and participatory dialogue. When complementarities and synergies 
were emphasised, network actors were more likely to feel valued and to engage positively with relevant 
processes. The IFM system in Cameroon is built on certification of quality management processes as a 
way of improving trust in monitoring outcomes and increasing the legitimacy of civil society actions. 
Trust relationships are also identified through the organisation of joint research and fact finding missions 
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between government agencies and NGOs (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). The current model of 
collaboration still shows signs of weakness and mistrust. In multiple cases where independent missions 
have been organised by the IFM network, government departments and the advocacy partner 
Transparency International will still organise separate field missions to cross check and verify claims 
made by NGOs. This suggests that even though the SNOIE system has been externally audited and 
certified as ISO9001 compliant, national stakeholders still have doubts or are yet to trust the integrity of 
the system to deliver credible monitoring outputs. It also demonstrates a weakness in the design and 
operation of the network especially the role of unilateral actions of international ‘good governernace’-
based organisations, like Transparency international, in field missions. For non network actors the role of 
Transparency international may actually undermine the established systems in place. Duplicative field 
missions lead to a waste of limited resources and inefficiencies. Koppenjan and Klijn (2012) recommend 
strengthening coordination between network actors as one of the right conditions to address trust issues 
within networks. 
 
6 Conclusion  
 
The governance network framework proposed by Koppenjan and Klijn (2012) provided a useful lens 
to assess the functioning of the IFM governance network in Cameroon. Additionally, Trubek and Trubek 
(2007) and Gutierrez and Morgan (2017)’s framework on the interaction of governance systems provided 
new insights into how network actors interact amongst themselves but also with external state governance 
systems they seek to influence. By drawing on these rich theoretical foundations, this research allowed us 
to have a more comprehensive understanding of the key success of the governance factors for IFM in 
Cameroon but also the challenges which may undermine its effectiveness.  
We also highlighted the lack of financial viability of IFM initiatives which has the potential to 
undermine the NGO’s ability to monitor and hold those in decision making positions accountable. 
Drawing on experience from the Central African initiative (CAFI) in the Congo Basin, a basket fund 
model could be a good starting point toward an efficient solution where interested donors contribute 
funding which is then granted by a fund management unit to IFM organisations. An additional approach 
could be to explore IFM funding from fines collected by national governments as a result of IFM actions. 
The Indonesian experience of an IFM fund (Independent forest monitoring fund, 2018) presents an 
interesting case study to draw on. Future research could explore the possibility of an IFM fund to ensure 
financial sustainability drawing on limited experiences from the Indonesian VPA. We also found that 
NGOs lack the capacity and skills to navigate the fluid relationships between different governance 
systems. Actors need to emphasize complementarities and substitution effects in their attempts to manage 
rival and adversarial situations in order to maintain pacific coordination especially with government. In 
this direction, this paper joins Arts (2014) in that the role of the state has not diminished at all in the area 
of forest control and law enforcement.  
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